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Robust determinants of OECD FDI in developing 
countries: Insights from Bayesian model averaging
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Abstract: In this paper, we examine the determinants of outward FDI from four major 
OECD investors, namely, the US, Germany, France, and the Netherlands, to 129 devel-
oping countries classified under five regions over the period 1995–2008. Our goal is to 
distinguish whether the motivation for FDI differs among these investors in developing 
countries. Rather than relying on specific theories of FDI determinants, we examine them 
all simultaneously by employing Bayesian model averaging (BMA). This approach per-
mits us to select the most appropriate model (or combination of models) that governs 
FDI allocation and to distinguish robust FDI determinants. We find that no single theory 
governs the decision of OECD FDI in developing countries but a combination of theories. 
In particular, OECD investors search for destinations with whom they have established in-
tensive trade relations and that offer a qualified labor force. Low wages and attractive tax 
rates are robust investment criteria too, and a considerable share of FDI is still resource-
driven. Overall, investors show fairly similar strategies in the five developing regions.
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1. Introduction
Since the mid 1990s OECD countries have begun placing an increasing share of their FDI into devel-
oping countries (DC), specifically, in Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA), East and South Asia 
(ESA), Latin America and Caribbean (LAC), Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA).
Concentrating among the major OECD investors, namely, the US, Germany, France, and the 
Netherlands, we see that their presence, in the regions mentioned above, varied substantially.1 As an 
indicator for FDI commitment in a country, we consider the amount of outward foreign direct invest-
ment stocks in that destination per inhabitant of the investor country. Figure 1 shows the trend of 
FDI positions of the regarded OECD investors in 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2008. In 1995, the Netherlands 
had by far the most intensive FDI activity in DC, ahead of other European countries and the US. Both 
the Netherlands and the US invested primarily in ESA and LAC. Germany engaged mostly in LAC, 
while its commitment in ECA and ESA was only half as high. For France, a similar picture emerged, 
although its internationalization was even lower than that of Germany. SSA and MENA were virtually 
neglected by all OECD investors.
In 2000, 2005 through 2008, the internationalization via FDI in DC has increased dramatically for 
all aforementioned OECD investors, especially the European ones. The Netherlands has propelled its 
commitment also in ECA by 2008, becoming equally high internationalized in ESA and ECA, followed 
by LAC. Germany has shifted its focus to ECA, ESA, and MENA. A similar tendency is observed with 
France. European OECD investors had not only discovered ECA in that period, but also ESA and MENA 
as FDI fields. For the US, LAC remains the first FDI destination although ESA has become almost 
equally important. In contrast to the European investors, ECA and MENA are subordinate for the US 
investors. SSA still hardly attracts OECD FDI.
These facts raise several important questions: (1) What determines FDI from high income OECD 
countries to different developing regions? (2) Do different OECD investors have different motives for 
different location factors in these regions? (3) What are the prospects of these regions for further 
FDI? Which factors must DC improve to become attractive FDI locations? (4) Given the abundance of 
FDI determinants considered in the literature, which are indeed the most crucial ones?
Figure 1. OECD countries’ FDI 
per inhabitant (in US$) position 
by region of destination.
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A bulk of literature investigating the determinants of FDI has emerged aiming primarily to pinpoint 
which factors FDI recipients have to provide to secure FDI inflows (for a review see Blonigen, 2005; 
Faeth, 2009). In most of the studies, the key determinants of FDI considered are: market potential 
and labor costs as well as distance. Others emphasize the role of certain types of FDI determinants 
such as taxation, human capital, infrastructure, macroeconomic factors, institutional factors, and 
trade liberalization.
Several studies also investigate the determining factors for specific regions (e.g. Bellak & 
Leibrecht, 2008, for Eastern Europe; Hattari & Rajan, 2009, for Asia; Trevino, Thomas, & Cullen, 2008, 
for LAC; Mohamed & Sidiropoulos, 2010, for MENA; and Asiedu, 2006, for Africa). In contrast, there 
are a few studies that look at the motives of the investor countries (see, e.g. Nasser, 2007, for the 
US; Toubal, Kleinert & Buch, 2005, for Germany; Pfister & Deffains, 2005, for France), and according 
to our knowledge there are no studies that compare and contrast FDI determinants in developing 
countries of several geographical regions simultaneously.
The most closely related studies to ours is that of Blonigen and Piger (2014) and Eicher, Helfman, 
and Lenkoski (2012). Blonigen and Piger (2014) employ a Bayesian model averaging (BMA) approach 
on bilateral FDI stocks and 56 potential determinants of FDI. Their results indicate that the tradi-
tional gravity variables, cultural distance factors, relative labor endowments, and trade agreements 
are the most robust determinants, while little support is found for multilateral trade openness, most 
host-country business costs, host-country infrastructure, and host-country institutions. Eicher et al. 
(2012) use bilateral FDI outflow data and 55 regressors over the period 1988–2000 for 46 countries 
(of which 21 non-OECD), and utilize also a BMA approach so as to resolve the model uncertainty that 
surrounds the validity of the competing FDI theories. Eicher et al. (2012) show that more than half of 
the previously suggested FDI determinants are not robust and highlight theories that do receive ro-
bust support from the data. Unlike, the aforementioned studies, we focus on bilateral FDI stocks of 
major OECD investor in 129 developing countries classified under five geographical regions over the 
period 1995–2008. This is the major contribution of this study.
Given the variety of investment patterns of OECD investors described above, and the scarce litera-
ture in this field, it is imperative to further explore how the motives of these investors differ, and 
whether these motives differ between certain host regions. Answers to such questions are of great 
importance. They would permit OECD investors and their governments to elaborate on their interna-
tionalization strategy and to advance a specific international economic dialogue that would support 
it. Moreover, they would indicate to DC which conditions must be improved in order to attract more 
or specific investors.
The second major contribution of this study is to shed more light on the robustness of OECD FDI 
determinants in developing countries. Although the literature has emphasized particular groups of 
determinants, there is a limited number of studies (see e.g. Blonigen & Piger, 2014; Eicher et al., 2012) 
that looks at a rich set of determinants in an attempt to distinguish the most crucial ones. In our 
study, we exploit a large set of 35 potential determinants including, among others, market size and 
market dynamics, labor costs, human capital, infrastructure, trade relations, macroeconomic factors, 
and institutional factors. We employ a BMA technique, which was originally employed in cross coun-
try growth regressions by Fernandez, Ley, and Steel (2001b), to identify robust model(s) explaining 
the FDI patterns of our investors to different developing regions.
The results of our empirical analysis reveal that there is no single theory that governs the decision 
of OECD FDI in developing countries but a combination of theories. In particular, major OECD inves-
tors prefer: (1) FDI destinations with whom they have already established intensive trade relations, 
and search for advanced DC with skilled labor force. (2) Low wages and attractive tax rates are ro-
bust investment criteria too, and (3) a considerable share of their FDI is still resource-driven. We do 
not find that macroeconomic and institutional factors are robust FDI determinants. Our investors 
reveal fairly similar strategies in the various FDI destinations, although, certain particularities 
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appear, like the absence of resource-oriented German FDI and its request for efficient government 
authorities. Since many developing countries score poorly with respect to point (1) they are not at-
tractive for OECD investors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the determinants of FDI 
and the hypotheses regarding our investor countries. Section 3 describes the model specification 
and the data. Section 4 discusses the BMA methodology. Section 5 presents the empirical results 
and, finally, Section 6 concludes.
2. Motives and determinants of FDI
In this section, we briefly discuss the theoretical and empirical evidence on the determinants of FDI, 
and posit the hypotheses concerning our investors. We group the determinants under the following 
areas: market size, market development (income, human capital, and infrastructure), cost factors, 
resources, openness and bilateral relations, macroeconomic factors, and finally institutional 
factors.
Market size  is considered as one of the key determinants in Dunning’s OLI paradigm (Dunning, 1993) 
and the most tested hypothesis in empirical studies (see e.g. Barrell & Pain, 1999; Busse & Hefeker, 
2007; Campos & Kinoshita, 2010; Wheeler & Mody, 1992). Thus we are interested to test whether mar-
ket size and market dynamics are among the prime determinants of our investor countries which 
would be considered as strong evidence for market-seeking FDI.2 We conjecture that geographical 
distance, common language, and former colonial links may promote this type of FDI.
While market-seeking FDI in ordinary consumer goods will be less sensitive to the development 
level of the host country, market-seeking FDI with technologically advanced products, as they are 
typical for our OECD investors, will be constrained to destinations with advanced development mani-
festing itself in higher income level, well educated workforce, and developed infrastructure (e.g. see, 
Nunnenkamp & Spatz, 2003).3
Noorbakhsh, Paloni, and Youssef (2001) proposes that human capital explains why FDI has 
reached only a limited number of developing countries. Azémar and Desbordes (2010) and Suliman 
and Mollick (2009) conclude that relatively low FDI flows into Sub-Saharan Africa are partly 
explained by poor human capital and illiteracy. We propose that market-seeking FDI of OECD coun-
tries, producing higher quality products and services, is linked to the availability of human capital. As 
an indicator for human capital we consider labor productivity, as we found it to provide a better 
proxy of the educational level in DC than primary and secondary school enrollment; the only educa-
tion indicator available for our large set of DC.
Similarly, the manufacture of advanced products and services entails a need for communication 
with high technology media and thus requires a well functioning telecommunication and internet 
network. Globerman and Shapiro (2003) argues that the US firms invest only in countries with a 
threshold level of infrastructure. Bénassy-Quéré, Gobalraja, and Trannoy (2007), and Bellak and 
Leibrecht (2009) found that infrastructure in Eastern Europe promotes FDI. More specifically, Campos 
and Kinoshita (2010) showed that telecommunication is important for FDI in Eastern Europe and 
LAC. We hypothesize that telecommunication technologies are important determinants of FDI and 
test, in particular, whether investors search destinations with a high rate of internet accessibility 
 and a high rate of fixed and mobile telephone lines.
Investment in developing countries often arises from the motivation to save costs and, thus, to 
dislocate a part of (vertical FDI) or the entire production to low wage countries or countries with 
attractive tax rates (efficiency-seeking FDI).4 We are interested in examining to which extent 
efficiency-seeking FDI is the prime motive for investors and thus consider the wage gap between the 
destination and the sender country. Braconier, Norback, and Urban (2005) found that about 20% of 
the US multinational sales are based on low wages of skilled labor and Konings and Murphy (2006) 
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concluded that in the post-1992 period the US FDI in the EU periphery was discouraged in places 
with high labor costs. Bellak and Leibrecht (2008) estimated that increasing labor costs had a nega-
tive effect on FDI inflows into the CEECs. In addition, tax rates are important determinants for FDI 
inflows, according to recent studies, such that of Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2007) and Bellak and 
Leibrecht (2009) who found that FDI inflows have become very sensitive to tax rates in Eastern 
Europe. Both propose that the tax elasticity of FDI is higher than that of infrastructure.
Since the beginning of the 2000s, resource-seeking FDI, geared by increasing demand and rising 
commodity prices, has once again boomed. Investment in extractive industries involves large-scale 
investment, and investors can often act as monopolists. A good relationship with governments is 
essential. Autocratic regimes and corruptive systems may facilitate the operation of businesses. 
However, political instability and the risk of expropriation can potentially lead to high costs and 
losses (Buckley, 2008; WIR, 2007). In some regions, such as Africa, resource abundance seems to be 
a major reason for FDI inflows (Asiedu, 2006). Consequently, we are interested in knowing to which 
extent resources are important for OECD investors and which conditions destinations have to offer 
to investors in extractive industries.
Another aspect related to FDI inflows is the degree of openness of the host country to interna-
tional trade, established bilateral trade relations and bilateral free trade agreements (FTA). First, 
open economies—openness being indicated by exports plus imports as a share of GDP—have liberal 
trade regimes, long established international economic relations and are competitive on the world 
market. This should provide a positive setting for investors. FDI would benefit from the liberal trade 
regime which would facilitate to use the affiliate as export base. For different world regions, Campos 
and Kinoshita (2010), Trevino et al. (2008), de Boyrie (2010), and Sekkat and Veganzones-Varoudakis 
(2007) found that openness of the host country is an important factor explaining FDI inflows. Second, 
we posit that investors will have a stronger propensity to put their FDI into countries with whom 
external relations have already been established. In particular, we consider the position of the host 
country in the home country’s total trade over the past five years. Third, we postulate that FTAs en-
courage FDI, notably efficiency-seeking FDI. Bilateral trade agreements provide opportunities to dis-
locate productions in lower cost countries and to import the product without trade barriers. There is 
evidence that FTAs of the US with Central America have generated important FDI flows into this re-
gion (Waldkirch, 2010). The same applies for FTAs between the EU and Eastern Europe (Baltagi, 
Egger, & Pfaffermayr, 2008). The perspective of vertical and efficiency-seeking FDI under FTAs will 
increase with the wage gap of the host country, as argued in Kim (2007).
Since the early 1990s, the number of Double Taxation Treaties (DTTs) and Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (BITs) has grown substantially. BITs contain provisions for investor-state dispute settlement 
with international institutions and reduce the uncertainty of expropriation (WIR, 2005). The impact 
of these treaties on FDI is ambiguous. For instance, Desbordes and Vicard (2009) investigated the 
impact of BITs on FDI and found that it depends on the political relationship between the signatory 
countries. Only in case of tense relationship, BITs would promote FDI flows.
Macroeconomic stability has been stressed in numerous empirical studies as an important deter-
minant of FDI (e.g. Asiedu, 2006; Campos & Kinoshita, 2010; Lansbury, Pain, & Smidkova, 1996). 
Macroeconomic stability is proxied by low inflation rate, stable currency, and low external debt. 
There are several examples suggesting that increasing external debt will worsen the creditworthi-
ness of countries, generate solvency problems and lead to currency devaluations. Under these con-
ditions, the value of the investment can fall substantially. Currency devaluations and highly volatile 
exchange rates can also result from current account deficits and other risk factors. High and volatile 
inflation leads to increased uncertainty and, consequently, to higher investment risk. Thus, FDI will 
be discouraged under such conditions. Busse and Hefeker (2007), Asiedu (2006), Campos and 
Kinoshita (2010) as well as Trevino et al. (2008) showed that the level of inflation is an important 
factor for FDI inflows in DC. Servén (2003) documented that exchange rate uncertainty, i.e. volatility, 
discourages private investment into DC. Clark and Kassimatis (2009) found that default risk leads to 
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lower FDI in Latin America. Therefore, we will examine below the impact of the exchange rate and 
inflation rate, their volatility, as well as the impact of external debt on FDI in developing countries in 
order to find out to which of the aforementioned factors are highly robust.
Given the differentiated degree of FDI flows on Eastern Europe and LAC, and the low FDI record of 
Africa, international bodies, such as the World Bank, have recently stressed the importance of institu-
tions as an attempt to attract additional FDI. Poor institutions that discourage FDI include: (1) Political 
instability characterized by violence, civil war, or simply weak governments. (2) Countries with a poor-
ly developed democracy/political accountability.5 (3) Poor legal protection of assets that increases 
the chance of expropriation of firms’ assets. (4) Poor quality of institutions that are necessary for 
well-functioning markets (and/or corruption) increasing the cost of doing business (Meyer, 2001).
A number of studies have documented the importance of the aforementioned factors for FDI in 
large worldwide samples (e.g. Busse & Hefeker, 2007; Campos & Kinoshita, 2010; Wernick, Haar, & 
Singh, 2009), or specific regions (e.g. Asiedu, 2006; Naudand & Krugell, 2007, for Africa; Barrell & 
Pain, 1999, for Eastern Europe; and Trevino et al., 2008, for LAC). We are thus interested in examining 
whether institutions are identified as robust determinants of FDI in the various developing countries 
under the BMA approach.
3. Model specification and data
In order to examine the main determinants of FDI in developing countries originating from major 
OECD investors, namely, the US, Germany, France, and the Netherlands, we collect bilateral FDI 
stocks data over the period 1995–2008 in 129 recipient developing countries classified (according to 
the World Bank classification) under the following five regions: Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA, 
28 countries), East and South Asia (ESA, 22 countries), Latin American Countries (LAC, 20 countries), 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA, 18 countries), and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA, 41 countries) (see 
Table 1).
We then estimate the following model:
where FDIijt is the FDI position of OECD investor i  in country j at time t per inhabitant of country i . 
Equation (1) includes the following matrices:
•  MARKETSIZEjt & MARKET DYNAMICjt: including the variables GDPjt and GDP growth, GROWTHjt.
•  DEVELOPMENTjt: including GDP per capita, GDPPCjt, labor productivity, LPRODjt, wage differen-
tial, WAGEijt, and an interaction term of WAGE and LPROD, WAGE_LPRODijt.
•  RESOURCESjt: including per capita production of oil and gas (OILjt, GASjt), and the share of min-
erals and ores in exports MINORESjt.
•  OPENjt & ECONOMIC RELATIONSijt: including the share of the host country in investor’s total 
trade, BTRADEijt, trade openness of the host country, OPENjt, existence of bilateral free trade 
agreement, FTAijt, bilateral investment treaty, BITijt, and double taxation treaty, DTTijt.
•  MACROSTABILITYjt: including the exchange rate index, EXCHjt, exchange rate volatility, 
STDEXCHjt, inflation rate, INFjt, volatility of inflation, STDINFjt, and external debt rate, DEBTjt.
(1)
FDIijt = 훼ij + 훽1MARKETSIZEjt&MARKET DYNAMICjt
+ 훽
2
DEVELOPMENTjt + 훽3RESOURCESjt
+ 훽
4
OPENjt&ECONOMIC RELATIONSijt + 훽5MACROSTABILITYjt
+ 훽
6
INFRASTRUCTUREjt + 훽7INSTITUTIONSjt
+ 훽
8
CULTURAL TIESitj + 훽9MARKET PROXIMITYjt + 휖ijt,
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•  INFRASTRUCTUREjt: including the number of fixed and mobile telephone lines per inhabitant, 
MOBFIXjt, and internet access per inhabitant, INTERjt.
•  INSTITUTIONSjt: including an index of political stability, POLjt, democratic accountability, ACCjt
, government efficiency, GOVjt, regulatory quality, REGjt, law and order, LAWjt, and corruption, 
CORRjt.
•  CULTURAL TIESijt: containing interaction terms of host’s GDP and the presence of English/
French language (GDP_LANGUSjt, GDP_LANGFRAjt) and colonial ties, GDP_COLONijt.
•  MARKET PROXIMITYijt: including the interaction of GDP and distance between i and j, 
GDP_DISTijt.훼ij denotes fixed effects, and 휖ijt is the error term. Equation (1) explains the FDI com-
mitment of the investor in a region by host country characteristics containing more than 30 vari-
ables. A detailed definition and sources of the variables are given in Table 2.
Further, we include interaction terms for investors/regions like GDP_BTRADE for big economies 
with intensive trade relations, and market development, or infrastructure indicators interacted with 
institutional or macroeconomic factors. This permits us to capture multiple investment strategies in 
a given region. For example, we may find that an investor does not care for institutional quality, 
while it does so in locations with resources.
In any estimation of FDI determinants the issue of endogeneity of variables may arise. Note that 
our dependent variable is bilateral FDI stocks per head of the investor country while the explanatory 
variables, market size, market dynamics, and income level, are related to the host country. Since we 
take into account bilateral FDI stocks—not total inward stock into country jt—and not flows, we 
practically rule out reverse causality. In the case of bilateral trade relations where endogeneity with 
FDI may arise, we used past trade relations.
Table 1. Classification of regions
 Note: Regional classification is based on the World Bank’s classification. 
Region name Countries included Number of countries
Europe and Central Asia Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, 28
(ECA) Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia,
Lithuania, Macedonia (FYR), Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia,
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan
East and South Asia Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, 22
(ESA) Korea Rep., Lao PDR, Macao (China), Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan,
Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam
Middle East and North Africa Algeria, Bahrain, Cyprus, Djibouti, Egypt (Arab Republic), Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, 18
(MENA) Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia,
United Arab Emirates, Yemen (Republic)
Sub-Saharan Africa Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, 41
(SSA) Chad, Congo (Democratic Republic), Congo (Republic), Cote d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea,
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho,
Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria,
Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo,
Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Latin American countries Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, 20
(LAC) Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname,
Uruguay, Venezuela (RB)
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Table 2. Definition of variables
Variable Definition Source
FDI Annual log of bilateral outward FDI stocks per capita at current US$ UNCTAD, OECD, and National Bank Statistics
(data scaled upwards by 171 to avoid logs of negative/zero values)
GDP Log of GDP at constant 2005 international billions US$, PPP WDI
GROWTH 5-year average of annual growth rate of GDP at constant 2005 US$ Authors’ calculation based on WDI,
relative to 5-year average regional mean WEO, and WIIW
GDPPC Log of GDP per capita at constant 2005 international US$, PPP WDI
LPROD Labor productivity defined as GDP per person employed at constant Authors’ calculation based on IMF-IFS, WEO, ILO,
2005 international US$, PPP WDI, and United Nations Statistical Yearbook
WAGE Monthly wages of host country (at constant 2005 US$) Author’s calculations based on ILO,
as a share of home country’s monthly wages UNIDO, HDR and WDI
WAGE_LPROD Interaction of WAGE and LPROD
OIL Log of Crude oil and NGL production (kt, kbbl/day) per capita Authors’ calculations based on World Oil
(data scaled upwards by 0.001 to avoid logs of zero values) Statistics IEA and Index Mundi
GAS Log of Natural gas indigenous production (thousand cubic metres) Authors’ calculations based on World Natural
per capita (data scaled upwards by 0.001 to avoid logs of zero values) Gas Statistics IEA and Index Mundi
OIL_GAS Interaction of OIL and GAS
MINORES Minerals and ores exports (at current US$, SITC Rev.3, Authors’ calculations based on COMTRADE,
codes 27 and 28) as a share of total exports UNCTAD, and WDI
BTRADE 5-years lag of exports and imports (at current US$) of home country to Author’s calculations based on IMF DOTS,
host country as a share of its total exports and imports of home country COMTRADE, and WDI
OPEN Exports and imports (at current US$) divided by GDP at current Author’s calculations based on WDI
2005 international US$, PPP
FTA Dummy variable that equals 1 if there is Free Trade Agreement into WTO
force between home and host country, 0 otherwise
BIT Dummy variable that equals 1 if there is Bilateral Investment Treaty into ICSID and UNCTAD
force between home and host country, 0 otherwise (date into force used)
DTT Dummy variable that equals 1 if there is Double Taxation Treaty between UNCTAD
home and host country, 0 otherwise
EXCH Log of nominal exchange rate index (2005=100) WDI, OECD IDIS, and CIA World Factbook,
(national currency per currency of the sender country, period average) various years
STDEXC Standard deviation of past five years of nominal exchange rate index Author’s calculations based on WDI, OECD IDIS,
divided by mean of past five years of nominal exchange rate index and CIA World Factbook, various years
INF Log of annual growth OF CPI (2005=100) Authors’ calculation based on WDI, WEO, UN,
(data scaled upwards by 0.172 to avoid logs of negative/zero values) and CIA
STDINF Standard deviation of past five years of CPI (2005=100) divided Authors’ calculation based on WDI, WEO, UN,
by mean of past five years of CPI and CIA data
DEBT 1-diff of external debt stocks (at current US$) as a share of total Authors’ calculations based on WDI, WRI, EIU,
exports (at current US$) UNECE, UNECA, and CIA data
MOBFIX Log of mobile and fixed-line telephone subscribers (per 1000 people) WDI
(data scaled upwards by 0.001 to avoid logs of zero values)
INT Log of internet users (per 1000 people) WDI
(data scaled upwards by 0.001 to avoid logs of zero values)
ACC Voice & Accountability WGI
POL Political Stability & Absence of Violence/Terrorism WGI
(Continued)
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4. Empirical methodology—BMA
As discussed in Section 2, the literature on the determinants of FDI has identified a large number of 
variables that are being correlated with FDI. A recent survey on FDI determinants by Faeth (2009) 
presents nine theoretical models explaining FDI flows along with their empirical performance. In 
particular, the nine theoretical models are: (1) FDI based on the neoclassical trade theory (2), owner-
ship advantages (3), aggregate variables (4), the ownership, location and internalization advantage 
framework (5), horizontal and vertical FDI models (6), the knowledge-capital model (7), diversified 
FDI and risk diversification models (8), and policy variables (9). The author shows that there is no 
single theory of FDI, but a variety of theoretical models attempts to explain FDI. In other words, not 
all determinants in each of the nine theoretical models are found significant. Thus, any analysis of 
FDI determinants should be explained more broadly by a combination of factors from a variety of 
theoretical models. Put differently, the various FDI theories are typically compatible with one 
another. For instance, a theoretical view holding that market size matters for FDI is not logically 
inconsistent with another view that emphasizes the role of openness on FDI.
Since theory does not provide sufficient guidance for selecting the proper empirical model, the 
issue of model uncertainty arises. So far the empirical literature on the robustness of FDI determi-
nants is limited (two exceptions are Blonigen & Piger, 2014; Eicher et al., 2012). Model averaging 
techniques have been proposed to account for such model uncertainty. The basic idea behind model 
averaging is to estimate the distribution of unknown parameters of interest across different models. 
The fundamental principle of BMA is to treat models and related parameters as unobservable, and 
to estimate their distributions based on the observable data. Based on prior information on the 
parameters and considering all possible models, i.e. given by all possible combinations of regressors, 
the posterior probability of models and regressors are estimated.6
Variable Definition Source
GOV Government Effectiveness WGI
REG Regulatory Quality WGI
LAW Rule of Law WGI
CORR Control of Corruption WGI
LANG Dummy variable that equals 1 if home and host country share a CEPII
common language (that is spoken by at least 20% of the population),
and 0 otherwise
GDP_LANG Interaction of GDP and LANG
COLON Dummy variable that equals 1 if home country was former colonizer CEPII
in the host country
GDP_COLON Interaction of GDP and COLON
DIST Distance (in 1000 km) between sender country and destination country Author’s calculations based on CEPII
GDP_DIST Interaction of GDP and DIST
TAX Log of highest marginal tax, corporate tax (%) WDI, KPMG, Michigan University, OECD, Price
Waterhouse, DoingBusiness, Eurostat, Tesche, 
WIIW,
IBFD, Deloitte, Central & East European Tax
Directory, Global Market Briefings, International
Tax Review, Investment Guide for Southeast Europe,
Ernst & Young
Table 2. (Continued)
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We have a data-set on FDI determinants stretching over 14 years and can thus, investigate how 
the effect of FDI determinants changes across countries and over time. Therefore, we will apply BMA 
in the panel data context based on LSDV estimation.
In the face of model uncertainty, a formal Bayesian approach can be used to treat the models as 
random variables, and conduct inference on them.
Let us assume that, in order to describe the data, y, we consider the following possible models Mj , 
with j = 1, ..., J, grouped in the model space . Each model contains a different set kj of explanatory 
variables, K, and includes individual effects, 훼i. These models are normal linear regression models 
which differ in their regressors. The number of possible models is 2K, where K is the number of 
explanatory variables.
Our data consist of N countries and T periods in each of the five regions. In vector y, which is of 
length NT, we group the dependent variables for all countries and all models. In matrix X, which is 
of dimension NT × (K + N), we stack the explanatory variables and the N dummy variables for each 
country. The regression coefficients and individual effects are given in the full (K + N)-dimensional 훽 
vector. Then, any model Mj for country i  with T observations is represented by:
where Xj
i
 is the Txkj submatrix of regressors of model Mj and 훽 j is the k vector of slope coefficients, 
훽
j
휖ℜ
kj
(0 ≤ kj ≤ K). 휄T is a column vector of T ones, and 휀i is the T × 1 error vector that is normal, 
with covariance matrix 휎2IT, not autocorrelated and independent of X
j
i
, 훼i, and 훽
j. The normality as-
sumption guarantees good finite sample properties albeit not necessary for consistency (Fernandez, 
Ley, & Steel, 2001a).
According to the logic of Bayesian inference, the posterior distribution of any quantity of interest, 
in our case, 휃j(= 훽 j , 휎, 훼i), is a weighted average of the posterior distributions of 휃
j under each of the 
models, where the weights are given by the posterior model probabilities (PMPs) and is denoted by:
This approach is typically known as BMA and it follows from direct application of Bayes’ theorem 
Leamer (1978). p(휃j|yi ,Mj), the posterior distribution of 휃j under model Mj, is typically of standard 
form. Nevertheless, due to model uncertainty we need to compute the PMPs. Therefore, we have to 
choose a prior distribution over the model space  of all 2K possible models. We follow standard 
procedures for BMA in linear regression models of the existing literature (see, for instance, Fernandez 
et al., 2001b; Hoeting, Madigan, Raftery, & Volinsky, 1999; Masanjala & Papageorgiou, 2008) by 
assuming a uniform distribution and that regressors are independent of each other, so that the prior 
probability of each model is
implying that the prior probability of including any regressor equals 1
2
, and is independent of the 
combination of regressors included in the model.7 Given this prior the posterior model probability is 
given by
where p(yi|Mj) is the marginal likelihood of model Mj given by
(2)yi = 훼i휄T + X
j
i
훽
j
+ 휀i ,
(3)p(휃
j|yi) =
2K∑
j=1
p
(
휃
j|yi ,Mj)p(Mj|yi).
(4)p(Mj) =
1
2K
(5)p(Mj�yi) = p(yi�M
j
)∑2K
i=1 p(yi�Mi)
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where p(yi|훼i , 훽 j , 휎,Mj) is the sampling model corresponding to Equation (2), and p(훼i , 휎), and 
p(훽 j|훼i , 휎,Mj), are the relevant priors specified below in Equations (7) and (8), respectively.
Computational burden of BMA can be prohibitive as the number of models under consideration, 2K, 
is huge since it increases exponentially with the number of regressors included. Moreover, because the 
integrals may not exist in closed form additional difficulties are raised in the derivation of the integrals 
in Equation (6). Having at least 30 regressors in our estimations, we approximate the posterior distribu-
tion on the model space  by applying the Markov Chain Monte Carlo Model Composition (MC3) meth-
odology by Madigan and York (1995) to simulate a sample from . MC3 is based on a Random Walk 
Chain Metropolis-Hastings algorithm which takes draws from the model space focusing on models 
with high posterior model probability. Posterior results based on the sequence of models generated 
from the MC3 algorithm can be calculated by averaging over the draws.
Another important aspect under the Bayesian framework is the decision on the prior structure for 
the parameters in each model Mj: 훼i , 훽
j, and 휎. Since the choice of priors influences the results we 
therefore choose non-informative priors.8 Yet, improper non-informative priors for parameters that 
are not common to all models can lead to unmeaningful calculated PMPs. Therefore, we use the fol-
lowing benchmark priors developed by Fernandez et al. (2001a) that do not require subjective input 
or fine tuning for each individual model. We take the {훼i} to be independently uniformly distributed 
on the real line and also adopt a uniform prior for the scale parameter common to all models which 
gives us
This prior implies that equal prior weight is given to all values of 훼 and 휎 for ln(휎). Moreover, this 
distribution is invariant under scale transformations such as changes in the measurement units. For 
훽
j, we adopt an informative g-prior structure
with the following choice of the scalar hyperparameter gj
This weighting factor, which is a decreasing function of the sample size, depends only on the number 
of regressors and the sample size. This prior resembles the one suggested by the risk inflation crite-
rion (RIC) of Foster (1994) and has good small sample performance (Fernandez et al., 2001a).
5. Empirical results
We base our discussion below on the most important regressors having a posterior inclusion prob-
ability (PIP) above the recommended threshold of 0.50. According to Raftery (1995), evidence for a 
regressor with a posterior inclusion probability from 50 to 75 % is called weak, from 75 to 95 % posi-
tive, from 95 to 99 % strong, and >99 % very strong. Masanjala and Papageorgiou (2008) state that 
a PIP of 0.50 corresponds approximately to an absolute t-ratio of one. We also indicate the regres-
sors that are included in at least one of the 10 best models, however, we do not discuss them in or-
der to focus on the main results.
The results of the BMA approach are based on the MC3 chain with four million draws for the pooled 
sample in Section 5.1.1 and two million for the regional samples in Section 5.1 (the initial half million 
draws are discarded). To verify convergence of the algorithm, and thus the accuracy of the posterior 
(6)p(yi|Mj) = ∫ p(yi|훼i , 훽 j , 휎,Mj)p(훼i ;휎)p(훽 j|훼i , 휎.Mj)d훼i d훽 j d휎,
(7)p(훼i , 휎) ∝
1
휎
.
(8)p(훽
j|훼i , 휎,Mj) ∼ N(0, 휎2[gjX � jXj]−1),
(9)gj = min
{
1
NT
,
1
(K + N)2
}
.
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moments, we regard the correlation between the analytical and MC3 PMPs for a subset of models 
(for example, every model visited by the MC3 algorithm) and take enough replications to ensure this 
correlation lies above 0.99 as suggested by Fernandez et al. (2001a). The correlation between visit 
frequencies and posterior probabilities for our BMAs lies above this recommended threshold.
5.1. FDI Determinants in different regions of developing countries
We begin our analysis of FDI determinants by performing the BMA analysis on the model specified in 
Equation (1) in each of the five developing regions for each single investor. Table 3 reports the pos-
terior moments and mean coefficients of the BMAs regarding FDI in each developing region for each 
of our four OECD investor countries. Above the horizontal line, the regressors with a PIP of more than 
0.5 are being presented, while below that line we report the regressors that are included in the 10 
best models. Table 4 presents the frequencies of the robust determinants found in the BMAs for each 
region. The determinants are grouped under the areas: market size, market dynamics, market devel-
opment, resources, openness and economic relations, macro stability, infrastructure, institutions, 
cultural ties, and market proximity.
5.1.1. FDI determinants for OECD investors in ECA
According to Tables 3 and 4 we find that established trade relations are the most robust FDI deter-
minant for European investors in ECA. Furthermore, trade openness is also a robust factor for 
European investors in ECA. On the one hand, FDI in ECA is attracted by low wage countries.9 On the 
other hand, investors search for markets that are more advanced, with higher wages and higher 
productivity. Particularly, for France and the Netherlands, market development is an important fac-
tor of their FDI position in the region. Finally, for all our investors, except Germany, resource abun-
dance has been an important factor of their FDI commitment in the region. Dutch FDI is much more 
correlated with resources than the other countries’ FDI. In the case of the Netherlands, the coeffi-
cient of resources is the highest. Institutional factors are not important for European investors.10
Other factors that are above the 0.5 PIP threshold are, nevertheless, less robust and appear at 
lower frequency. For instance, macroeconomic stability is a robust factor only for two investors (i.e. 
lower exchange rate volatility in Germany and lower inflation in France), developed infrastructures 
are only important for two investors (the US and the Netherlands) and institutions appear also only 
for two investors both with negative and positive signs.
These robust determinants highlight the fact that not a single theory of FDI, as postulated by 
Faeth (2009), could be identified, but rather a combination of theories. The suggested determinants 
correspond to the following investment strategies in ECA: (1) all investor countries have been 
engaged in advanced transition countries in the CEEC. For European investors, trade relations and 
openness were important factors of investment in these countries. Investments are also promoted 
by relatively high productivity, better infrastructure, and economic stability. Germany has exclusively 
invested in countries of ECA with these features. Hence, it appears that Germany’s investment in 
ECA—which accounts for a major share of its global FDI commitment in DC (see Figure 1)—is fairly 
conservative. (2) In contrast to Germany, the US, France, and the Netherlands have all had a second 
equally important investment strategy in that region: they invest in oil and gas producing countries, 
such as Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and in early transition countries with low wages and less 
developed institutions (the US tolerates low democracy in this region and has concluded DTT with 
these countries). (3) France and the Netherlands pursue the most differentiated investment strate-
gies in ECA. In addition to the aforementioned strategies, investors are also in search for large, low 
wage countries in ECA, namely Russia and Turkey, and for small European transition countries like 
Serbia, Romania, and Bulgaria. France is willing to tolerate a less developed legal system, provided 
the size of the market is large and wages are low.
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Table 4. Frequencies of robust FDI determinants by region of investment
AREA Variable ECA ESA LAC MENA SSA
Market 
size
Large Small Large Small Large Small Large Small Large Small
GDP 2 3 4 1 4 1 2 3 1
Market High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low
Dynamics
GROWTH 4 1 1 1
Market Devel-
oped
Poor Devel-
oped
Poor Devel-
oped
Poor Devel-
oped
Poor Devel-
oped
Poor
Develop-
ment
GDPPC 1 2
LPROD 4 1 2 1
WAGE_
LPROD
3 3 3 1 1 1
WAGE 3 3 3 1 2
Resources Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
OIL GAS 3 2 2 1 3 1
MINORES 1
Open-
ness,
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Economic
Relations
BTRADE 3 4 4 3 2
OPEN 3 4 1
FTA 3 1
BIT
DTT 1 2 1
Macro Stable Unstable, Stable Unstable, Stable Unstable, Stable Unstable, Stable Unstable,
Stability Deprecia-
tion
Deprecia-
tion
Deprecia-
tion
Deprecia-
tion
Deprecia-
tion
EXCH 2 2
STDEXCH 1 1 1 1
INF 1 2 1
STDINF 1 1
DEBT
Infra-
structure
Devel-
oped
Poor Devel-
oped
Poor Devel-
oped
Poor Devel-
oped
Poor Devel-
oped
Poor
MOBFIX 2 3 3 1 1
INT 2 2
Institu-
tions
Strong Poor Strong Poor Strong Poor Strong Poor Strong Poor
POL 1 1 1 1 1
ACC 1 1
GOV 3 1 1
REG
LAW 1 1
(Continued)
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5.1.2. FDI determinants for OECD investors in ESA
The developing region of East and South Asia has received a lot of interest from all our investor 
countries. There is a number of location factors which governs OECD FDI in ESA uniformly, and, in 
general, host countries in this region have to fulfill a number of criteria.
Our BMA analyses suggest that established trade relations, openness, high labor productivity, big 
markets size with English language, as well as low telecommunications infrastructure appear to be 
the most robust determinants of OECD FDI in ESA.
Thus, a dual investment strategy appears to be in place in ESA: (1) OECD investors reveal strong 
(and similar) preference—more than in other regions—in their highly focused investment strategy 
on big and developed markets characterized by openness, established trade linkages, and good 
management of English language. Dynamic markets is not in their preferences, however, high level 
of productivity is required—proxied by high education levels—and well-developed infrastructure. 
These factors are not only highly robust, but also have a high impact on the size of the FDI position. 
A 1% increase in the market size (GDP) is reflected in an increase in the bilateral investment position 
of 0.10% originating from France, 0.23% from the US and Germany, and 0.58% from the Netherlands. 
High labor productivity increases on average FDI positions in each country in ESA by 0.19% (from 
France), 0.20% (from the US), 0.29% (from Germany), and 0.47% (from the Netherlands). In high 
wage countries, an increase in telecommunication infrastructure leads to more FDI. The countries 
corresponding to this investment strategy include Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, and South Korea. 
(2) The BMA estimations suggest a second FDI focus for all four OECD investors: countries with es-
tablished trade links, low wages, low productivity, and poor infrastructure. Once again, these factors 
are highly robust.11 However, we find lower elasticities for FDI associated with these factors. The 
elasticity of FDI with respect to lower telecommunication infrastructure lies between 0.04 and 0.06% 
(see Table 3).
Moreover, OECD FDI in ESA does not focus on resource abundant countries. In particular, Germany 
and the Netherlands are not interested in gas abundant countries. As in the case of FDI in ECA, we 
find that macroeconomic and institutional factors are no prominent determinants in ESA. We only 
observe that Germany and France accept exchange rate devaluations which might indicate that 
they are interested in investing in countries which keep their currencies competitive through 
devaluations.
5.1.3. FDI determinants for OECD investors in LAC
According to Tables 3 and 4 the most robust FDI determinants for OECD investors in LAC are large 
markets with established trade relations, minor trading partners, FTAs, high productivity countries 
with high wages, low inflation, and resource abundance.
AREA Variable ECA ESA LAC MENA SSA
CORR 1
Cultural 
ties
Close No ties Close No ties Close No ties Close No ties Close No ties
LANGUS 4 1 2
LANGFRA 1
COLON 1
Market 
proximity
Close Far Close Far Close Far Close Far Close Far
GDP_DIST 1 2
Table 4. (Continued)
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This indicates that all investors invest in large markets with whom intensive trade relations have 
already been established. Given the negative coefficient of established bilateral trade relations, we 
can retrieve a threshold value of GDP beyond which this determinant gets positive, and find that this 
is the case for all big economies in LAC, i.e. Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela. On the other hand, as the 
BMA indicates that established bilateral trade relations is also a negative robust factor for European 
investors, FDI is attracted by economies with whom investors maintain little trade relations. This 
suggests that European FDI is partly a substitute for trade. However, European investors also prefer 
destinations that are under the umbrella of a common FTA. The BMA results indicate that both highly 
productivity countries interacted with high wages, and low wages are robust determinants for three 
investors, but with a lower PIP. Resource abundance (gas and minerals) appears to be robust FDI 
determinant for three investors. Macroeconomic stability with a dislike for inflation appears as a 
robust determinant, however, is subordinate to the aforementioned ones. The same applies for insti-
tutional factors.
In addition, the variables which appear as robust FDI determinants correspond to conflicting in-
vestment strategies, which we can sort out by checking the coincidence of robust factors for specific 
cross-sections: (1) We find that investors primarily focus on large LAC markets with whom also in-
tensive trade relations have been established (such as, Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela). The US and 
Germany prefer these destinations due to low wages. (2) We see that three countries (the US, 
Germany, France) have also a preference on advanced markets with relatively high wages and pro-
ductivity, as well as better macroeconomic stability. OECD investors have established economic rela-
tions with these destinations, reflected in DTT (the US) or FTA (Germany, France). Examples are 
Argentina and Chile. (3) The US, Germany, and France show a third common investment criteria in 
the poorest economies with whom France and Germany maintain a few trade relations. An example 
is Peru. (4) The US, France, and the Netherlands pursue a resource-seeking investment strategy too. 
The US invests in Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil for gas and France in Chile for minerals. The 
Netherlands prefers high growth destinations with abundant in minerals and gas, covered by FTA, or 
without trade links. A few examples are Chile, Argentina, and Bolivia.
5.1.4. FDI determinants for OECD investors in MENA
As we have seen in Figure 1, the region of MENA received increasing attention from European inves-
tors during the investigation period. For France, MENA has even become the most important FDI lo-
cation, although immediately followed by ECA and ESA. In contrast, the US commitment in MENA 
has remained rather moderate.
According to the results of the BMA analyses (see Tables 3 and 4) our investors seem to pursue 
fairly individual investment strategies. Besides GDP, which appears—also in combination with cul-
tural ties—for the US and France, no other determinants are consistently found to be robust. Three 
factors which belong to the “market development” area are reported with a negative sign. There are 
practically no robust factors in the areas of “economic relations”, “macroeconomic stability”, and 
“infrastructure”. We find, however, repeatedly that institutional factors are robust determinants. For 
two countries, “cultural proximity” is also a robust investment factor.
Although investors are attracted by fairly individual factors in MENA, we can derive some common 
investment strategies: (1) All four investors focus primarily on developed markets, and the US and 
France even on large developed markets. However, within this strategy, they have a different set of 
FDI determinants. This is also reflected in the FDI destinations that are related to this FDI strategy. 
For instance, the US and France prefer more culturally related destinations (such as, Israel and 
Egypt). Developed infrastructure is a condition for the US and the Netherlands. European investors 
also care for developed institutions, e.g. Germany for government efficiency, France for low corrup-
tion, and in the Netherlands law and order appears in the 10 best models. France and the 
Netherlands—the two countries with the strongest presence in MENA—have invested in a number 
of more developed countries in the Middle and Far East (such as, Kuwait, Emirates, Saudi Arabia, 
Israel, and Cyprus). Germany has invested in just a few places (e.g. Emirates, Malta, and Cyprus). (2) 
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France and the Netherlands have also a second in rank investment strategy in less developed mar-
kets with low wages and low productivity. Again, France shows a preference for culturally related 
countries in this group. The FDI destinations in North Africa and the Near East (such as, Algeria, 
Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon, Libya) correspond to this investment strategy. (3) Finally, we see that the 
US, France, and the Netherlands pursue resource-oriented investment strategies in North Africa and 
the Gulf region.
In addition, the presence of French and Dutch FDI in MENA can be explained by the willingness of 
their investors to engage in very different areas which might also bear higher risks. Germany has 
increased its investment preference in all parts of MENA following, however, clearer and thus more 
restrictive investment criteria. For all European investors—with France to a lesser extent though—
these destinations are new and challenging. Established trade relations do not show to be an impor-
tant determinant. Consequently, a part of European FDI in MENA seems to be market-seeking.
5.1.5. FDI determinants for OECD investors in SSA
The results presented in Tables 3 and 4 indicate that among our OECD investors FDI determinants 
differ in SSA. However, as we discuss below, one can associate the same investment strategies 
among them with those factors.
Thus, the robust FDI determinants are manifold—much more than in the aforementioned regions. 
Nevertheless, market size appears to be a robust factor for three OECD investors. Oil and gas are also 
robust factors for three investors. Three variables that indicate “market development” are found as 
additional robust factors (i.e. GDPPC, EXCH_GDPPC, WAGE_LPROD, WAGE). In contrast to ECA, ESA, 
and LAC but as in MENA, variables in the area of “openness and economic relations” are marginally 
robust FDI determinants. As in the case of the other investment regions, macroeconomic and insti-
tutional factors are of minor importance.
Despite the diversity of robust FDI factors, we can extract three types of investment strategies 
pursued by OECD investors in SSA: (1) All four countries have an investment focus on large developed 
markets. Diverse robust FDI factors correspond to this strategy: large income per capita, high wages 
and labor productivity, and developed telecommunication infrastructure. Moreover, for the US and 
the Netherlands English language is important within this strategy, while for Germany and France 
established trade relations matter. The FDI destination that covers all of these criteria is South 
Africa. (2) The European investors also pursue a second investment strategy, by focusing on poor 
countries, with poor infrastructure, and weak institutions. (3) Finally the US, France, and the 
Netherlands invest in SSA for resource-seeking motives. An example is Nigeria. The Netherlands 
holds resource-seeking investment in several locations, such as, Nigeria, Angola, Cameroon, the 
Republic of Congo, and South Africa.
If we compare the FDI determinants found for OECD FDI in SSA with the motives revealed in the 
other regions, we see that SSA can be only of minor importance to our investors. It offers little po-
tential for market-seeking FDI that our investors associate with labor productivity and infrastruc-
ture.12 SSA is largely seen as an FDI location for resource-seeking FDI as shown in Asiedu (2006).
5.2. FDI determinants for OECD investors in developing countries in general—
Similarities and differences
Having established robust FDI determinants in specific groups of developing countries, we would like 
to conclude our analysis with the factors our investors care in developing countries in general. To 
achieve that, we perform the BMA analysis by pooling all developing countries simultaneously.13
Table 5 reports the posterior inclusion probability (PIP), the posterior mean, and the posterior 
standard error of the BMA results for all developing countries for each of the four OECD investors 
during the period 1995–2008.
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These estimations show that established trade relations, high wages together with high produc-
tivity, low taxes, and market size are the most robust determinants of OECD FDI in developing 
countries.
In particular, all investors prefer destinations with whom good trade relations are established. FDI 
follows trade. The US and France prefer culturally related destinations. Linguistic ties is an important 
condition for them. All investors search for the most advanced markets in the developing world with 
high wages and high labor productivity; and all, except the Netherlands, search large markets. This 
suggests that all investors pursue a market-seeking FDI strategy. Thus, we can confirm the result found 
in the empirical literature on the importance of the market size factor (see Section 2) but indicate, in 
addition, its specific nature. All investors reveal an efficiency-oriented investment strategy, looking for 
locations with low wages or low tax rates. This confirms the findings of Braconier et al. (2005), Bénassy-
Quéré et al. (2007), and Bellak and Leibrecht (2009) but in a much larger country context than the exist-
ing literature. From this, we can also conjecture that investors wish to engage in vertical FDI where 
productions are dislocated to low wage destinations.
Comparing the scale of the FDI impact of variables across investor countries we see that estab-
lished trade relations have a considerably higher impact for European investors than for the US. 
French FDI is less sensitive to the wage level than that of other investor countries. The US focuses 
more than the other countries on big markets. FDI of France and the Netherlands reacts stronger to 
taxation than German FDI. The superior size of the coefficients of all variables in the estimation for 
the Netherlands reflects its leading investment position.
In contrast to the picture drawn in the literature (see Section 2), we see that macroeconomic sta-
bility is in general no robust FDI factor and, if so, it appears with a lower PIP. The little robustness of 
institutional factors in our results is in contrast to the findings of Busse, and Hefeker (2007) and 
Wernick et al. (2009) who propose that institutions play a major role for FDI decisions. However, their 
studies include only a very limited number of other variables while we include some 30 additional 
explanatory variables in our BMA. Thus, we have to conclude that when a large number of potential 
determinants are included in the estimations, institutional factors are no longer important.
Besides the FDI determinants that were found in common among the four OECD investors, inves-
tors also reveal individual preferences in developing countries. For the US, the area of “openness and 
economic relations” is more important than that for other investors. The US prefers globalized des-
tinations. Furthermore, it is explicitly searching for destinations covered by a free trade arrange-
ment. Surprisingly, telecommunication infrastructure is a robust factor with negative sign for the US. 
This might indicate that a part of its investment focuses on the poorest developing countries, 
i.e. those with a poor infrastructure. Note, however, that the impact of these individual US determi-
nants is far less than that of the aforementioned factors, as shown by the size of their coefficients. 
Germany is the only investor for whom institutional quality is a robust FDI determinant. It searches 
destinations with government efficiency. France and the Netherlands care for macroeconomic sta-
bility. Surprisingly, France has an investment focus on countries which are not covered by a DTT. This 
might reflect the fact that it thrives among others for destinations which are less familiar to her. In 
the case of the Netherlands, developed infrastructure, low inflation, and oil abundance are addi-
tional robust FDI determinants.
Overall, the determinants of OECD FDI found robust in developing countries do not fall under a 
single theory but a combination of theories posited in Faeth (2009). These results are in line with 
those in Eicher et al. (2012) and Blonigen and Piger (2014).
6. Conclusions
The purpose of this study is to shed light on the robustness of FDI determinants in developing coun-
tries. To achieve that, we examine outward FDI stocks from four major OECD investors, namely the 
US, Germany, France, and the Netherlands into 129 developing countries grouped into five world 
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regions over the period 1995–2008. In an attempt to find robust explanatory factors we employ a 
BMA approach. We utilize more than 30 different potential determinants which can be clustered into 
market size and market dynamics, market development (including labor costs and human capital), 
resources, openness and bilateral trade relations, geographical and cultural proximity, macroeco-
nomic factors, institutional factors, and infrastructure. Finally, we allow for heterogeneity across 
investor countries in each developing region. The BMA analysis permits us to identify the dominant 
FDI determinants for individual OECD investors in DC, in general, and within the aforementioned 
regions. The results suggest that, under the BMA analysis for a large number of candidate FDI deter-
minants, some factors proposed in the literature cannot be identified as robust. In other words, the 
identified determinants do not fall under a single theory, but a combination of theories presented in 
Faeth (2009).
When investigating the FDI determinants of individual investors in all DC simultaneously, we find 
that all investors prefer developing countries with established trade relations between them. All 
pursue two main strategies: (1) an efficiency-oriented FDI strategy opting for destinations with low 
wages and attractive tax rates and (2) a market-seeking FDI strategy searching advanced markets 
with high productivity and high wages; and with some preference for big economies. Concerning the 
size of the impact of these factors on FDI, the criteria “labor qualification” and “established trade 
relations” are by far the most robust ones. In contrast to the literature, we do not find that macro-
economic and institutional factors to be consistently robust FDI determinants when a large set of 
determinants is taken into account. Our investors show some individual requirements on FDI loca-
tions: For the US “openness and economic relations” are more important than that for others. The US 
and France prefer markets with linguistic ties. Institutional quality is a robust determinant only for 
Germany; and macroeconomic stability only for France and the Netherlands. The Netherlands is the 
only investor that prefers locations with oil abundance.
Developing countries that wish to attract FDI should invest in the qualification of their workforce 
and establish economic relations with potential investors. Low wages and taxes have a lower poten-
tial to attract FDI.
Within the regarded regions Eastern Europe and Central Asia, East and South Asia, Latin America 
and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa, our OECD investors reveal 
to some extent similar, but also differentiating investment patterns.
The Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA) region has become the major FDI destination for our 
European investors, while US’s commitment in ECA has remained moderate. For Germany, ECA has 
become the most important FDI destination, and it ranks second, close to its Asia commitment, for 
the Netherlands. European investors reveal high importance to destinations in Eastern Europe that 
have become open economies and established trade partners. All investors search for advanced 
markets in Eastern Europe with high productivity and higher wages. For Germany, this is the only 
investment strategy in ECA, while the US, France, and the Netherlands have also been searching for 
oil and gas abundant locations in Central Asia. France and the Netherlands pursue the most diversi-
fied investment strategy in ECA, searching for low wage late transition countries and low wage big 
economies too (such as, Turkey and Russia). For European investors, Eastern Europe has gained an 
equal important role as has Latin America (LAC) for the US. Their FDI has been attracted by Eastern 
European countries due to a favorable productivity-wage level and trade integration. The US com-
mitment in Eastern Europe is much smaller than the European one is in Latin America, which may be 
related to missing cultural and political ties that we found to be important for the US.
East and South Asia (ESA) has increased significantly FDI positions from all our OECD investors over the 
past decade. All our investors show—more than in other regions—the following highly focused and com-
mon investment strategies: (1) on advanced large markets with a high productivity level, a good manage-
ment of English language, open economies and with established trade relations, and (2) low wage/low 
productivity destinations with poor infrastructure with whom they have established good trade relations.
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Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) has been traditionally the most important FDI destination 
for the US. It ranks in fourth place in importance for Germany and France and in third place for the 
Netherlands; the latter having the highest commitment of all investors in this region. All investors 
prefer big LAC markets with whom good trade relations have already been established. Besides that, 
investment strategies reveal to be heterogeneous among OECD investors. European investors have 
placed their FDI also in destinations that are minor trade partners, which would indicate that FDI is 
a substitute for trade in these distant destinations. In addition, investors look for destinations with 
low wages as well as advanced economies with high productivity in LAC. The US, France, and the 
Netherlands invest in the region for resource-seeking motives. Since Dutch FDI is to a considerable 
extent resource-seeking, it has become the most intensive in the region. Trade liberalization and FTA 
negotiations seem to have been important for LAC countries to attract FDI, developing productivity/
education will be important for further FDI.
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has also grown significantly in importance for our 
European investors, but only modest for the US. Investment motives are very individual in this 
region, although, all four investors have a strong focus on developed markets in the region. The US 
and France prefer destinations with cultural proximity. A developed infrastructure is a strong crite-
rion for the US and the Netherlands. In contrast to other regions, we find that investors in MENA 
namely European investors, care for institutional quality. Established trade relations are not an im-
portant determinant for OECD investors. For European investors, except for France, this region is 
rather new and challenging. The US, France, and the Netherlands, but not Germany, have placed 
resource-oriented investment in the region. MENA countries can become more attractive for OECD 
investors when trade openness and external and cultural relations improve. There is an additional 
potential for market-seeking as well as efficiency-seeking investment. To become more attractive, 
countries have to improve their level of productivity, i.e. education.
The FDI commitment of major OECD investors in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has remained very 
modest. Despite the heterogeneity of FDI determinants in SSA, one can conjecture that all investors 
prefer South Africa, due to its market size, the English language, and the market development which 
is reflected in higher productivity and telecommunication infrastructure. European investors have 
also invested in poor countries in that region. All investors, except for Germany have placed FDI in 
SSA out of resource-seeking motives. The commitment of investors in SSA is not likely to attract FDI 
in a rapid fashion, as the region offers little potential for entry in advanced DC markets with an edu-
cated workforce, sufficient infrastructure, and effective administrations.
In summary, we can see from the analysis that major OECD investors show to a large extent com-
mon investment strategies in the regarded regions, although, the factors identified in our BMA anal-
ysis as robust determinants may be quite heterogeneous and do not fall under a single theory, but a 
combination of theories of FDI determinants. The Netherlands and France pursue the most diversi-
fied investment strategies while the US and Germany have a more restricted scope. In contrast to 
other investors, resources are not robust investment criteria for Germany. A common feature that 
appears is that investors reveal a strong preference for advanced markets with a qualified labor 
force, and prefer destinations with whom trade relations have been established. However, they also 
place FDI for reasons of cost-efficiency and thus search for locations with competitive wages and 
attractive tax rates. Investment is still resource-seeking to a considerable extent.
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Notes
1.    The other main OECD investors into DC are the UK, 
Switzerland, and Japan; unfortunately their FDI statis-
tics for our sample period are incomplete, as discussed 
below, and thus excluded from this study.
2.    Market-seeking FDI typically goes hand in hand with 
horizontal FDI where the entire production takes place 
in the host country in order to serve the local market, 
but not the export market. This type of FDI usually per-
mits firms to operate in markets which are protected 
by high tariff barriers.
3.    However, in our examination below we cannot perform 
the FDI analysis broken down by industry due to data 
unavailability.
4.    The intermediate or final product needs to be shipped 
back to the FDI home country, which requires suf-
ficiently low tariffs or free trade arrangements.
5.    Li and Resnick (2003) argue, however, that democratic 
countries limit multinational firms (MNF) in pursuing 
monopolistic behavior and local governments in offer-
ing generous incentives, which may as well result in 
reduced FDI.
6.    BMA techniques have been applied in numerous em-
pirical applications. In the growth context, Fernandez 
et al. (2001b) apply the BMA with different priors to de-
termine the most robust growth regressors that should 
be included in linear cross-country growth regressions. 
León-González and Montolio (2004) extend the BMA to 
a panel data framework.
7.    Since many researchers prefer more parsimonious 
models, there exists some discussion about the priors 
on the model space. Nevertheless, regular posterior 
odds ratios already include a reward for parsimony. 
Brock and Durlauf (2001), among others, are opposed 
to uniform model priors because of the implicit as-
sumption that a regressor’s probability is independent 
of the inclusion of others. They recommend a hierarchi-
cal structure for the model prior. However, this requires 
agreement on which regressors proxy the same 
theories. As stated in Eicher, Papageorgiou, and Raftery 
(2011), such a consensus is often not present and, 
therefore, independent model priors are preferable.
8.    In a growth regression context, two recent studies 
of Ley and Steel (2009) and Eicher et al. (2011) have 
analyzed the effects of prior choices on the robustness 
of parameter choices and coefficient estimates.
9.    The motivation of the US, France, and the Netherlands 
to invest in destinations in ECA with low wages which 
offer a reasonable productivity confirms previous find-
ings by Lansbury et al. (1996) for FDI inflows in Eastern 
Europe in general.
10.  Also, the study of Campos and Kinoshita (2010) could 
not verify that institutions matter for FDI flows into 
Eastern Europe.
11.  Note that for France, the BMA does not indicate 
telecommunications and wage interacted with labor 
productivity as robust factors, but rather small coun-
tries that were former colonies.
12.  The constraint of low productivity and missing educa-
tion for FDI inflows into SSA is also found in Azémar 
and Desbordes (2010) and Suliman and Mollick (2009).
13.  As we wish to include the taxation factor the pool 
excludes several countries in SSA and MENA for which 
taxation data are unavailable.
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